Part 11 · Part 11: The Cyber Specialization, Building the Model This Study Exists For
Every part of this masterclass ended with a cyber read: a short section translating that stage’s lessons into decisions for building a cyber model. Those sections were written stage by stage, as the parts landed. This part collects them, resolves them into one recipe, and instantiates the recipe at the two sizes LAB2 actually plans to build. It then does the two things a recipe alone cannot do: it reads the threat side and the competitor side with the same instruments the earlier parts built, and it states the evaluation discipline, Proof of Defense, that decides whether any of the numbers mean anything.
One boundary up front. This part is a study artifact. It assembles published evidence into a design. It does not spend money, download weights, or train anything, and it does not make the three LAB2 decisions that remain Brandon’s: the budget envelope, the teacher roster, and the base pick. Where the recipe below names a recommended base, it is reporting the LAB2 ladder’s current recommendation, not ratifying it.
The assembly: one recipe, stage by stage
The recipe is a chain of decisions. Each decision cites the part that earned it, because the point of the masterclass is that none of these choices should rest on taste when a published run has already paid for the answer.
Base selection: license first, tokenizer second, benchmarks third. (Parts 1 and 3.) The base must sit on a clean license chain end to end: weights license, the licenses of anything it was itself post-trained from, and terms that permit the training use LAB2 intends. Part 1’s ladder is the screen, and its trap section is the reason for the order: a license with a guardrail-termination trigger is a structural risk for cyber work specifically, because the work itself lives in the neighborhood those clauses describe. A stronger model on a contaminated or revocable chain is worth less than a slightly weaker model on plain Apache 2.0. Second screen is the tokenizer (Part 3): measure fertility on the text cyber work actually is, meaning code, logs, hex, base64, and shell, before falling in love with a checkpoint. A vocabulary that shreds high-entropy strings taxes every stage downstream. Benchmarks come third, and only the ones measured on the artifact that would actually ship (Part 10’s rule, below).
Corpus: build it the Dolma way, with the deep payload. (Part 2.) Every source named, every license recorded per source, dedup and decontamination published with the corpus, temporal splits respected so eval CVEs postdate training CVEs. The content decision is depth: the Web3 Audit Corpus shows what a findings-only corpus teaches, which is recognition without repair. The cyber corpus needs the payload that teaches work: vulnerable code, patch diffs, exploit traces, proof-of-concepts, crash and execution traces. In cyber the corpus is the capability, and an undocumented corpus is an unverifiable one.
Architecture: inherit it, do not design it. (Part 4.) LAB2 post-trains open bases; it does not pretrain an architecture in V0.1. What Part 4 contributes is selection criteria, not a blueprint: prefer designs whose serving economics fit owned hardware (the 30B band’s three body plans showed quality per token, quality per FLOP, and throughput per serving dollar have different winners), and treat hybrid and latent-attention designs as cache decisions, because Part 10 showed concurrent agent investigations are a KV capacity problem before they are anything else.
Pretraining: do not redo it; buy the domain shift at the anneal. (Parts 5 and 6.) Part 5’s run economics settle this: frontier pretraining is not the game at LAB2’s scale, and no optimizer challenger has a control run that would justify a from-scratch bet. The domain shift happens in midtraining, where the decaying learning rate makes the final mix the model’s settled memory.
Midtraining: the Dolmino-shaped cyber anneal. (Part 6.) Roughly half high-quality general replay as the forgetting anchor. Then the cyber slices, upsampled hard and the scarcest repeated rather than rationed: vulnerability write-ups and advisories, CVE records with references, exploit and patch pairs, secure-code corpora, protocol and RFC text, vendor documentation, postmortems. Micro-anneal each candidate source off one stable checkpoint and measure it against both cyber evals and the general suite before committing. Soup the anneal across data orders for a consistent gain and a free variance estimate. Keep an undecayed trunk checkpoint so domain anneals can branch without re-paying for the base. Buy context deliberately: a verified, regression-tested 128K beats an advertised 1M, and the short-context suite gets rerun after every extension stage. Measure forgetting in both directions, including refusal probes at base level, because the anneal sets the prior post-training starts from.
SFT: taxonomy first, verified traces as the unit. (Part 7.) Build the task taxonomy before the data: triage, static analysis explanation, patch drafting, patch verification support, log and alert summarization, detection-rule authoring, threat-intel extraction, tool-driven investigation. These are the gym and DeepThreat task families, and they are the same families Proof of Defense scores, with eval instances held out by construction. Examples carry tool traces, not final answers: alert or code in, real tool outputs interleaved, a conclusion the environment confirmed. Keep only trajectories that verify, rejection-sampled against cyber’s native checkers. This is the highest-leverage data construction available, and the traces double as the substrate the RL stage improves.
Post-training II: Cascade-shaped RL with execution rewards, distillation under the teacher constraint. (Part 8.) Sequence the RL stages the way Cascade does, easiest verifiable signal first, and let the reward be an execution outcome wherever the domain allows: the exploit runs or it does not, the patch closes the hole under re-test or it does not, the detection fires on the malicious sample and stays silent on the benign corpus or it does not. Fix survival under re-attack is a temporally structured reward, final only after the re-check. Distillation and MOPD are available, but only inside the teacher constraint, which is binding and not a preference: DeepSeek’s API is the only hosted API whose terms expressly permit training use including distillation; self-served open weights are the second clean line; OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini, Alibaba, Moonshot, and Z.ai GLM output is evaluation and panel material only, and GLM output never enters a LAB2 training set. A teacher you may legally train on is worth more than a stronger teacher you may only query.
Checkpoints: keep every stage boundary, because refusal must be diffable. (Parts 1 and 8.) Per-stage checkpoints, named so an outsider can reconstruct the lineage, are what turn a refusal claim into a checkable claim: diff the checkpoint before and after the stage that set the behavior. The same discipline catches reward hacking, because a suspicious gain can be diffed against the stage that produced it. K2-Horizon’s branch structure is the pattern to copy.
Evaluation: execution-verified, on the shipped artifact. (Parts 9 and 10.) The training harness and the eval harness are separate artifacts with held-out verification, and scores are measured on the exact build that ships: same precision, same engine, same configuration. Every artifact swap, including a requantization of identical weights, is a new model until the suite says otherwise.
Serving: sovereign by construction. (Part 10.) Everything runs on owned hardware, offline-capable, with updates arriving as versioned, hash-pinned artifacts, staged, evaluated, then rolled out, previous artifact kept for rollback. A cyber model that phones an external API is not sovereign regardless of its weights license.
Read the chain as a whole and one property stands out: each stage’s output is the next stage’s quality ceiling, and each stage’s documentation is the next stage’s debugging surface. A corpus without provenance makes the anneal unauditable; an anneal without micro-tests makes SFT’s failures unattributable; SFT without verified traces gives RL a fluent-but-wrong starting policy to amplify; RL without stage checkpoints makes its gains, and its hacks, undiffable; and any of it, evaluated on an artifact other than the one that ships, produces numbers about a model nobody runs. The recipe is therefore not a menu. Skipping a stage’s discipline does not save its cost, it moves the cost downstream and converts it from engineering time into uncertainty. This is also why the recipe transfers across sizes unchanged: the chain’s logic is about evidence, not scale, and scale only changes what each link costs.
Step A: the 4 to 9B instantiation
Step A exists to prove the pipeline end to end at a size where a full loop is cheap enough to run repeatedly: baselines on the untouched base, the anneal, SFT, a QLoRA run, and identical re-measurement, per the LAB2 program design.
Recommended base: Granite 4.1 8B Instruct. The recommendation rests on Part 1 and Part 3 criteria, in that order. Its license is plain Apache 2.0, which keeps the chain clean without a custom-license legal read. It is a from-scratch IBM pretrain rather than a derivative, so there is no upstream lineage carrying someone else’s terms or guardrail data into the artifact. Its tokenizer and general capability are adequate at the size, and 8B is the band where the M5 Max loop runs the full pipeline, anneal through eval, without queueing behind anything.
Control: OLMo 3 7B. The control is not a second candidate; it is the attribution instrument. OLMo 3 is the most completely documented release pattern in the field (Part 1 graded it rungs 1 to 7, with per-stage post-training checkpoints and an auditable anneal). Running the same recipe on Granite and on OLMo 3 separates recipe effects from base effects: if the cyber anneal moves OLMo 3 and does not move Granite, the base is the variable; if it moves both, the recipe is real. A program that cannot attribute its gains cannot improve them, and the control is what makes the Step A numbers worth publishing.
The loop. Score the untouched bases on the Proof of Defense card first, so every later number has a denominator. Run the cyber anneal (Part 6 shape) with micro-anneal source tests. Build the SFT set from verified range traces (Part 7). Run the QLoRA pass that V0.1 specifies. Re-measure identically, on the shipped artifact, and publish the card with refusals broken out by vulnerability class. The readiness gate already encodes the front half of this loop: a cleaned, provenance-documented training set, a scored Proof of Defense card on an untuned base, and a 30B-class LoRA through the full loop on the M5 Max.
Step B: the 30B class instantiation
Step B repeats the recipe where it starts to matter operationally: the 30B shelf band, which Part 4 identified as the masterclass sweet spot and Part 10 identified as the largest class that serves well on Spark-class owned hardware (a 30B-A3B at BF16 or NVFP4, with MoE active size producing usable agent throughput where a dense model of the same shelf size crawls).
Co-leads on the current ladder: Nemotron 3.5 Lightning 30B A3B and Muse Glimmer 30B. Lightning’s case is recipe fit: it is NVIDIA’s harness-throughput-tuned iteration of the Nano line, designed for exactly the many-short-calls-with-tool-round-trips traffic a fleet generates, and its license is OpenMDW-1.1, which Part 1 read directly and verified clean. The caution is the one Part 10 recorded: Lightning’s own card concedes the peak-capability comparison to rivals and sells cost per task instead, so Step B must measure capability on Proof of Defense tasks, not inherit the card’s framing. Glimmer stands as the co-lead so the band is not a single-vendor bet; its license and tokenizer reads are owed at the same standard before any run, per Part 1 discipline, and this part does not pre-clear them. The headline configuration already scoped in the parent goal, a Nemotron 3 Super 120B NVFP4 LoRA for cyber triage on the DGX Spark, sits above Step B as the demonstration run: same recipe, flagship base, sized for the trade-press moment rather than for iteration speed.
What changes between Step A and Step B is mostly budget shape, not recipe shape, but the changes are worth enumerating because each one is a place a program can quietly underfund the stage that matters. The anneal gets more tokens and more micro-anneal branches, because at 30B the cost of testing a source before committing it is trivial next to the cost of committing wrong. The SFT set grows by coverage rather than by volume: the taxonomy stays fixed, but each family gets the long tail of real range traces that Step A could only sample. The RL stage becomes affordable at rollout counts that matter, which changes its role: at Step A, RL is a proof that the execution-reward loop closes; at Step B, with rollout counts in the range Nemotron’s multi-environment runs use, RL becomes the stage where capability is actually bought, and its verifier quality becomes the program’s ceiling. Distillation options widen, because a 30B student can absorb a frontier open teacher’s behavior in a way an 8B cannot, still strictly inside the teacher constraint. Serving stops being a laptop question and becomes the fleet question of Part 10: concurrent investigations, shared prefixes, cache capacity per node. And the eval suite must grow private holdouts faster than the public suite, because a 30B-class release is the one outsiders will benchmark against the program, and a public suite everyone can train against measures the field’s diligence, not the model’s capability.
The threat side: offense is already a commodity
The recipe above would be an academic exercise if the threat were hypothetical. It is not, and the intake record from this month is the evidence.
ARTEX is the existence proof. The FBI’s FLASH of Nov 13, 2026 (FLASH-20261113-001, TLP:CLEAR) states that threat actors have weaponized ARTEX, an open-source, LLM-driven, multi-agent penetration testing platform written in Go, since at least August 2026, with intrusions completing in under three hours. ARTEX has no model of its own: it plugs in Claude, GPT, DeepSeek, GLM, Grok, and Kimi, and the FLASH reports the DeepSeek Flash family dominating in the field because of capability, low cost, and lack of observable guardrails when framed for pentesting. Impact in the FLASH: a South Korean financial campaign compromising accounts tied to more than 67,000 individuals, a ConnectWise Cloud Backup compromise affecting more than 2,250 downstream tenants, and more than 1,600 publicly exposed ARTEX consoles identified by early November 2026.
Jeffrey Appel’s lab review, the defender’s-eye companion, adds the two facts that should set defensive priorities. First, the technique is not new: ARTEX attacks exactly the way defenders have been taught for twenty years, and what changed is the clock. Storm-0940 reached privileged cloud access in under three hours, peaking at 2,900 failed sign-ins per minute; an unnamed actor went from a leaked GitHub secret to Azure Key Vault exfiltration in five minutes; when an API call failed, the agent adapted and succeeded within 28 to 80 seconds. Second, the economics are already trivial: a criminal campaign is estimated at roughly $145 to $1,500, mostly model compute. Appel’s review also carries the supply-chain warning that some circulating ARTEX clones carry backdoors, including unauthenticated root RCE in a Docker image, which is why the platform is a named adversary system in this study and never a tool to adopt.
The Offsec Harness Index is the tracking instrument. Daniel Miessler’s index answers one question with primary sources only: which open-source offensive AI harnesses have attackers actually used? At capture it tracked 154 harnesses, tied 14 to real attacks through 32 primary reports, and split them into Confirmed and Observed tiers, with news and forum posts treated as leads, never evidence. Its attack table is led by ARTEX, then Hermes Agent, then CAI. Two lessons ride on it. The harness layer is plural and interchangeable, so no defensive strategy premised on one framework, or on model denial, survives contact with the roster. And its method, primary reports plus an independent second check on every row, is the same verification posture Proof of Defense applies to model claims.
What this means for defensive priorities. The attacker does not need a better model. The attacker needs any capable model, a harness, and $1,500. Model access control is therefore not a defensive strategy; the FLASH’s own observation is that field usage routes to whichever model is cheap and unguarded. The defensive gap is elsewhere: detection content that works at machine speed (Appel’s five KQL hunts and telemetry set are Blue material precisely because static indicators age in minutes and behavioral detection is what holds), response that runs at the attacker’s clock rather than the approval chain’s, and models defenders can actually run themselves, on their own hardware, at a cost per resolved incident that survives continuous operation. That last item is the one a model program controls. It is also why the exposed-consoles finding matters beyond ARTEX: agent infrastructure is itself attack surface, and a sovereign serving stack (Part 10) is partly a security control, not only a licensing preference.
Two demand-side signals from the same intake cycle complete the picture. In the replies under the Offsec Harness Index, a practitioner asked for the defensive equivalent of the index, open harnesses teams can point at their own code, and noted that none exists. The index’s method applied to defense is unbuilt territory, and a program already committed to publishing its harness (Part 1, rung 7) is positioned to build it. And in the replies under Appel’s review, a security researcher said his team built a comparable offensive tool and is now afraid to open source it because ARTEX has been used mostly illegally. That chilling effect is a market force, not a mood: every capable team it scares away from publishing defensive tooling widens the asymmetry the FLASH documents. An open defensive program with a verification discipline is the counter-position, and it only works if the openness is real, which is why Part 1 graded openness before this study graded anything else.
The competitor reads, graded on the ladder
Part 1’s ladder grades releases, not press releases. Applied to the cyber-model field, it sorts the current field quickly.
Trident Poseidon: unverifiable by design. Poseidon, launched Nov 11, 2026, claims the strongest cyber numbers in public: 81.4 percent pass@1 on CWE-Bench v2’s public set, 42 of 44 flaw confirmations on its private Trident Bench against 32 for the best frontier setup, 99 percent patch completion, 2.3 percent false positives. Every figure is vendor-reported. The base model is not named. The training data is described in a sentence (120,000 plus engineer-written CVEs, patch diffs, exploit traces, binaries, crash dumps) that its own launch thread contradicts (hundreds of thousands of CVEs), with no corpus artifact, no provenance, no decontamination statement, which matters because CWE-Bench is built from public CVEs. There are no weights, no API, no public pricing; access is a demo-gated hosted service. On the ladder, Poseidon does not reach rung 1: there is no artifact to grade. That is a legitimate business choice and a real capability signal, but as evidence it is a claim, and the thread’s own replies named the market consequence: practitioner after practitioner asking for weights or an endpoint, and one concluding that the open cyber model gap is clear and nobody is filling it. LAB2’s differentiation is not beating Poseidon’s blog numbers. It is publishing numbers a stranger can rerun.
CyberQwen-class small specialists: the right shape, thin evidence. A CyberQwen-2B item surfaced on Reddit (r/ollama) in this intake cycle and was filed to LAB2 as a market comparable, not a base candidate. Flag it honestly: a social post is a lead, not a primary source, and this part asserts nothing about that specific artifact’s quality. The class is what matters. Small, local, cheap specialists are the form factor sovereign defense actually deploys at the edge: a 2B that runs on the analyst’s own machine, inside the enclave, on the incident’s data, without an API call leaving the building. Every independent appearance of one is demand evidence for the Step A band and for the serving thesis of Part 10. What the class generally lacks, and what LAB2 can own, is the upper rungs: published data provenance, stage checkpoints, and an eval harness a buyer can run. A small specialist with a full ladder behind it is a product a security team can put through procurement; a small specialist with a download link and a benchmark screenshot is a curiosity. The distance between those two is exactly the distance Parts 1, 2, and 9 measure.
Flint Abliterated: measured on the wrong artifact. The Flint case (Part 8 covered the mechanics) is the ladder’s cautionary tale in the other direction. The weights are public, and the refusal measurement on the card is real work: identical prompts, a rule-based classifier, benign controls. But the refusal figures (86.3 percent down to 10.4 percent) were measured on the BF16 base, while the artifact users actually download and run is a set of GGUF quantizations that were never measured, and no agentic benchmarks were rerun. Part 10’s rule states the verdict: a benchmark is a property of an artifact at a precision, not of a model name. Flint also demonstrates why LAB2 installs refusal behavior by its own training decisions on a clean chain rather than accepting a third party’s weight surgery on an un-audited artifact: the surgery may be exactly as advertised, and there is no lineage to diff it against.
The pattern across the three reads is the market opening, stated once: the field currently offers a choice between strong claims with no artifact (Poseidon), artifacts with no verification chain (the small-specialist class), and artifacts measured at the wrong precision (Flint). A release that ships weights, data provenance, stage checkpoints, and a runnable execution-grading harness, with scores measured on the shipped build, occupies ground none of them hold.
Proof of Defense: the discipline that grades everything above
Proof of Defense is Counterfleet’s evaluation and product discipline, and it is the standard every LAB2 release is scored against. It is built on the Five Fleets, whose job definitions are fixed text and are used here exactly as approved:
- Red scans and probes for vulnerabilities and checks exploit paths on replicas.
- Blue detects intrusions, contains them, and alerts the owner.
- Green patches and hardens, and its fix holds only when the exploit path fails on a re-check.
- Orange tracks disclosed threats, turns them into range training tasks, and pushes updates to every agent, model, and harness.
- White independently verifies execution and scores each run, and benchmarks the fleet’s agents against the user’s own code and threat profile.
The structural point is White. Verification is a separate fleet from the fleets being verified, which is the organizational form of Part 9’s rule that the training harness and the eval harness must be separate artifacts. A model program that grades its own homework with its training checker will eventually train to the checker; the ARTEX-era version of that failure is an agent that finds the scoring script instead of the vulnerability.
The headline metrics follow from the fleet jobs, and refusal is not among them:
- Attack success rate: how often Red’s chains complete against the defended replica, the direct measure of what the defense is worth.
- Detection and containment time: Blue’s clock, because Appel’s lesson is that the attacker’s advantage is tempo, and a defense that detects correctly in six hours loses to one that detects adequately in six minutes.
- Fix survival under re-attack: Green’s rule operationalized. A patch counts only when the exploit path fails on re-check, which makes patch quality an execution fact rather than a diff review.
- Cost per resolved incident: the efficiency term, inherited from Part 10. A defense that wins at unlimited tool calls and frontier API prices is a demonstration, not a product; Poseidon’s own stated motivation, that frontier inference cost makes continuous analysis impractical, concedes this metric’s importance.
Refusal rate is one diagnostic inside this system, published by vulnerability class and never as a single average (the BB Arena discipline: publish refusals by class; a silent model swap invalidates an attempt). It is a diagnostic because both directions are failures the headline metrics cannot see: a model that refuses defensive work on a class is a capability hole, and a model whose refusal behavior was never deliberately installed is an unmeasured risk. But a model with a perfect refusal profile that cannot find, prove, or fix a vulnerability scores zero on every metric that matters. That ordering, capability first and refusal as instrumentation, is the deliberate inversion of how frontier labs present cyber models, and it is the inversion the ARTEX evidence supports: the field’s binding constraint is verified defensive capability at machine speed, not the guardrail posture of any single checkpoint.
The reporting form matters as much as the metrics. A Proof of Defense result is a card, not a vibe: the base and every stage checkpoint named, the artifact’s precision and engine stated, the suite version and its holdout policy stated, the four headline metrics with their denominators, and refusals by class underneath. Private rotating holdouts sit behind the public suite, refreshed on Orange’s cadence as new threats are turned into range tasks, so a score cannot be bought by training against the test. That is the same primary-source, second-check discipline the Offsec Harness Index applies to attack attribution, pointed at LAB2’s own claims. The card is also the program’s public proof standard under the parent goal: the claim “best cyber models the world has ever seen” is earned against published cards that strangers can rerun, or it is not made.
The 2027 framing, and what this part does not decide
This masterclass exists because of a goal Brandon named on Nov 17, 2026: train the most cyber capable models he possibly can, and spend the year getting better at the craft of training them, with success proven in the open against public benchmarks and Proof of Defense results. His standing rule is that a new-year goal starts the second it is thought of, so the clock is already running; 2026’s remainder is the ramp, 2027 is full speed.
The goal has two halves and both are load-bearing: the output (the most cyber capable models he can produce) and the craft (deliberately getting better at training them across the whole year). The recipe above serves both, because every stage decision in it is written down with its evidence, which makes each campaign a training set for the trainer: what was tried, what the numbers said, what changed in the recipe. A running craft log across quarterly campaigns of increasing ambition is the mechanism, and this masterclass is its first entry: the study phase of the craft, done in the open, before the first run.
Two constraints govern execution. The first is that the binding resource is founder attention, not compute and not agent hours. The plan therefore routes everything except decisions through agents and surfaces work at gates: the masterclass itself was produced that way, parts in parallel, delivered as they landed. The second is estimation discipline: work is estimated in agentic time, agent wall-clock hours with compute-bound floors named separately. The LAB2 readiness gate was re-estimated on exactly that basis at 24 to 36 agent-hours, 48 with friction, 72 as the hard outer bound, and that estimate, not a calendar week, is the planning unit for every campaign the recipe above implies.
What this masterclass deliberately does not decide, stated plainly so the study is never mistaken for an authorization:
- The budget envelope. LAB2’s V0.1 envelope ($150 to $450) is unapproved. Nothing in Parts 1 to 11 spends against it.
- The teacher roster. Part 8 states the constraint (DeepSeek API and self-served open weights are the clean lines) but the roster itself, which teachers for which stages, is Brandon’s call.
- The base pick. Step A recommends Granite 4.1 8B with an OLMo 3 7B control and Step B names its co-leads; recommendation is not selection, and the pick is Brandon’s.
Until those three land, the recipe in this part is a design with its evidence attached, ready to execute the hour the approvals exist. That is the correct end state for a study: every decision it can make from published evidence, made and cited; every decision that belongs to the founder, named and left open.
Flagged and unverified
- All Poseidon performance figures are vendor-reported by Trident, with no independent verification, an unnamed base model, and an unreconciled discrepancy between its blog (120,000 plus CVEs) and its launch thread (hundreds of thousands). Treated in this part as claims, not measurements.
- ARTEX campaign figures come from the FBI FLASH and from Microsoft reporting as cited by Appel’s review; the $145 to $1,500 campaign cost is an estimate in that review, not an audited figure. The water-treatment SCADA claim circulating in replies to the FLASH post is an unverified user claim, not an FBI finding, and is not used here.
- The CyberQwen-2B item rests on a single Reddit post and is used only as demand evidence for a model class; nothing about the artifact itself is asserted.
- Flint’s refusal figures are the publisher’s, measured on the BF16 base; the shipped GGUF artifacts’ refusal behavior is unmeasured in public as of this writing.
- Muse Glimmer 30B’s license and tokenizer reads are owed at Part 1 standard before any Step B reliance; this part repeats the ladder’s co-lead status without pre-clearing it.
- Nemotron 3.5 Lightning’s capability framing is its vendor card’s; Step B capability must be established on Proof of Defense tasks, not inherited.
Sources
Masterclass Parts 0 to 10 (same folder), especially the cyber reads of Parts 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, and 10. FBI FLASH FLASH-20261113-001 (Nov 13, 2026) via the intake brief of Nov 14, 2026. Jeffrey Appel, ARTEX lab review (Nov 16, 2026) via the intake brief of Nov 17, 2026. Daniel Miessler, Offsec Harness Index (offsecharnesses.ai) via the intake brief of Nov 17, 2026. Trident Poseidon launch blog (Nov 11, 2026) via the intake brief of Nov 17, 2026. LAB2 program design and the parent goal guide (goal_0f0b6807f56a), including the readiness gate definition and the training-data terms constraint.